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Abstract
Background Growing rates of antibiotic resistance, caused by increasing antibiotic use, pose a threat by making antibiotics 
less effective in treating infections.
Objective We aimed to study whether physicians working at privately and publicly owned health centres differed in the 
likelihood of prescribing antibiotics and choosing broad-spectrum over narrow-spectrum antibiotics.
Methods To estimate the effect of ownership on the probability of a prescribed drug being an antibiotic, we analysed all 4.5 
million prescriptions issued from 2011 to 2015 at primary health centres in Västerbotten, Sweden. We controlled for patient 
age, sex, number of prescriptions per patient, and month of prescription, and used a maximum likelihood logit estimator. 
We then analysed how ownership affected the likelihood of a prescribed antibiotic being broad spectrum. We also used 
aggregated data to estimate the impact of the number of private health centres on the number of antibiotic prescriptions per 
inhabitant and the proportion of broad-spectrum antibiotics.
Results Holding other factors constant, private physicians were 6% more likely to prescribe antibiotics and 9% more likely 
to choose broad-spectrum antibiotics. An increase by one additional private health centre was positively associated with an 
increase in the number of antibiotic prescriptions per inhabitant and a higher proportion, although not significant, of broad-
spectrum antibiotic prescriptions.
Conclusion Our findings suggest that private physicians prescribe more antibiotics, especially broad-spectrum antibiotics, 
than public physicians. Therefore, it is crucial to provide health centres with incentives to follow guidelines for antibiotic 
prescription, especially when the level of private provision of primary healthcare is high.
Key Points for Decision‑Makers 
We found that physicians working at privately owned 
health centres were 6% more likely to prescribe antibiot-
ics than physicians at publicly owned health centres. In 
addition, the former were 9% more likely to choose a 
broad-spectrum antibiotic when prescribing any antibi-
otic. These results were obtained by controlling for other 
factors such as patient characteristics.
It may be especially important to monitor antibiotic 
prescription at private health centres and to give them 
economic incentives to adhere to guidelines for antibiotic 
prescription.
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1 Introduction
Antibiotics introduced into a specific environment exert 
selective pressure on the bacterial populations inhabiting 
that environment. This gives an advantage to antibiotic-
resistant bacteria which survive, reproduce, and can spread 
further. Antibiotic resistance (AR) is growing rapidly due 
to the intensive use of antibiotics, making these drugs 
increasingly less effective in treating infectious diseases. 
AR poses a significant threat to current and future genera-
tions [1].
The problem of inappropriate antibiotic prescription is 
especially relevant in primary care because the majority 
of antibiotic prescriptions are for respiratory tract infec-
tions (RTIs), which are frequent diagnoses in primary 
care; however, the cause of most RTIs is viruses, for which 
antibiotics are ineffective. Fleming-Dutra et al. [2] found 
that almost half of the antibiotic prescriptions for RTIs in 
the US were evaluated as inappropriate. There are many 
possible reasons why antibiotics are prescribed even when 
they are ineffective. For example, patients’ impatience 
and limited knowledge may increase their readiness to 
receive antibiotic treatment. They may consider the doc-
tor’s willingness to prescribe antibiotics as a characteristic 
of quality and care [3, 4]. This is especially relevant for 
countries with restricted over-the-counter sales of these 
pharmaceuticals. If uninformed patients demand antibiot-
ics for non-bacterial infections, and if the profitability of a 
healthcare centre depends on the number of patient visits, 
competition between these centres may create incentives 
to overprescribe antibiotics [5–7].
Previous research has shown that such economic incen-
tives may play an important role in physicians’ medical deci-
sion making [8]. However, there are not many studies on the 
effect of economic incentives on prescription of antibiotics. 
Notable exceptions are Hutchinson and Foley [9], Fogelberg 
[10], and Ellegård et al. [11]. Hutchinson and Foley found 
that physicians working under fee-for-service in Newfound-
land, Canada, prescribed significantly more antibiotics than 
salaried physicians. Using aggregated Swedish data, Fogel-
berg found that stronger competition between healthcare 
providers significantly increased the number of antibiotic 
prescriptions as long as the provider was not required to 
pay for the prescribed drugs. Using yearly data on the con-
sumption of pharmaceuticals by Swedish children, Ellegård 
et al. found that reimbursement schemes based on antibiot-
ics-related pay-for-performance indicators stimulated more 
appropriate antibiotic prescription.
In this paper, we focus on the effect of type of owner-
ship of healthcare centres on the prescription of antibiot-
ics. Silverman et al. [12] and Devereaux et al. [13] found 
a significant positive correlation between the proportion 
of profit-driven hospitals and health expenditure, while 
Kessler and McClellan [14] found that private hospitals 
with profit incentives had significantly lower costs than 
non-profit hospitals for treating heart attack, controlling 
for treatment quality. The latter indicates that private pro-
vision of health care can increase efficiency. Granlund [15] 
found that private doctors were more likely to disallow 
generic substitution. More recently, Ellegård [16] studied 
how pay-for-performance incentives affected primary care 
providers’ compliance with hypertension drug guidelines 
and found that private providers reacted more strongly 
to the economic incentives. To our knowledge, there are 
no studies to date addressing the impact of ownership of 
healthcare centres on the prescription of antibiotics.
The ability of private health centres to pay salaries and gen-
erate profits directly depend on the number of patients visits 
and patients listed at the health centre. We therefore hypoth-
esised that private health centres have stronger incentives to 
please patients, and one way to do this can be to prescribe 
antibiotics to patients who ask for this.
The main aim of our study was to determine whether there 
is a significant difference between private and public primary 
healthcare centres in antibiotic prescription. To answer this 
question, we analysed prescriptions written at public and 
private primary healthcare centres in Västerbotten, Sweden, 
primarily in two ways. First, we investigated whether the 
probability of the prescribed drug being an antibiotic var-
ies systematically across ownership type. Second, we tested 
whether there are systematic differences in the prescription of 
broad- versus narrow-spectrum antibiotics between private and 
public centres. The motivation for our second approach is that 
the rapid growth of AR has forced physicians to turn to more 
frequent prescription of broad-spectrum antibiotics. These 
antibiotics target a wider range of bacterial species, and hence 
contribute even more to the development of AR [17]. Thus, it 
is critical that inappropriate use of broad-spectrum antibiotics 
is reduced. However, patients may perceive prescription of a 
broad-spectrum antibiotic as a signal of high-quality health-
care because the probability of a patient being cured after the 
first prescription is higher in this case. Doctors’ willingness 
to please patients based on economic incentives, together 
with other possible factors (e.g. diagnostic uncertainty), may 
motivate them to prescribe broad-spectrum antibiotics more 
frequently. We also analysed the impact of a new private health 
centre on the number of antibiotic prescriptions per capita and 
the share of broad-spectrum antibiotics.
2  Institutional Background and Incentives
Sweden is divided into 21 counties that are responsible 
for primary healthcare. Although most of the health cen-
tres are managed by the county councils, the operation of 
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about 40% is outsourced to private providers contracted 
and financed by the counties [18]. Health centres are 
usually organised as team-based practices with general 
practitioners (GPs), nurses, midwives, gynaecologists, 
psychologists, social workers, behavioural therapists, and 
physiotherapists [19]. On average, there are four GPs in 
each health centre [18].
In 2010, Sweden implemented the System of Choice 
reform, aimed at increasing competition in primary 
healthcare by making entry to the market free for primary 
care providers fulfilling minimum requirements set by 
the county councils [20]. The System of Choice reform 
attracted new private providers to the market, and gave 
patients the free choice of registering with either a private 
or public provider. Patients register with a health centre 
rather than with a specific GP. Registration is obligatory 
for all residents except those from Stockholm County. 
If a patient does not make an active choice of provider, 
then he/she is listed in a public or private health centre 
suggested by the county council. The most common sug-
gestion is the centre closest to the patient’s residence. 
Although everyone in Sweden is free to choose a primary 
healthcare provider, only 30% choose a health centre dif-
ferent from the one suggested by the county [21].
Health centres should accept all new applicants and 
can pose only temporary restrictions on the number of 
patients. Patients registered at one centre can still visit 
GPs at other health centres [18]. Both public and private 
centres receive a mixture of capitation payment for regis-
tered patients (about 80%), fee-for-service (17–18%) and 
performance-based compensation (2–3%) for achieving 
different targets for quality [18]. In Västerbotten, capita-
tion payments for registered patients constituted 87% of 
reimbursement to health centres.
Västerbotten County, located in the north of Sweden, 
is the second largest county, in terms of area, in the coun-
try, and consists of 15 municipalities. There are about 
260,000 inhabitants in the county, 45% of whom live in 
the municipality of Umeå. At the beginning of our study 
period from 2011 to 2015, there were 6 private and 32 
public health centres in Västerbotten, but in March 2014 
a new private health centre opened in the municipality of 
Umeå. The proportion of private health centres in Väster-
botten is much lower than that at the national level, which 
may partly be because the requirements that primary care 
providers have to fulfil to enter the market are higher in 
this county than in most other counties. For example, each 
health centre must offer its patients maternity care, chil-
dren’s care, and rehabilitation services [22, 23]. The high 
requirements also reduce the heterogeneity across health 
centres by restricting entry for health centres with limited 
services. Moreover, the listing system in Västerbotten has 
been criticised because, after the System of Choice reform 
was introduced in 2010, patients who did not make an 
active choice of provider stayed on the list of their previ-
ous health centre [24]. This principle created difficulties 
for new private providers because they had to start their 
practice with no patients on the list, and their ability to 
pay salaries and generate profits directly depend on capita-
tion and payments for patient visits. Therefore, we hypoth-
esised that private health centres have more incentives to 
attract new patients by pleasing them.
3  Methods
3.1  Data
To test our hypotheses, we used a dataset containing all 
fillings of prescriptions written at health centres in Väster-
botten County from January 2011 through December 2015 
and dispensed by Swedish pharmacies until April 2016. 
The dataset consists of approximately 11 million observa-
tions and includes a large number of variables, such as the 
patient’s age at the time of drug prescription, sex, and area of 
residence. The information about each prescription includes 
the date of prescription and the workplace of the prescriber.
After excluding prescriptions written by health profession-
als other than physicians (e.g. nurses) and those with missing 
information, e.g. the Anatomical Therapeutic Classification 
(ATC) code, about 10 million observations remained. A large 
proportion of drugs was prescribed with an option for repeat 
purchases. As we were interested in analysing physicians’ 
prescription decisions, we removed all repeat fillings and 
arrived at a dataset of 4,596,194 observations.
3.2  Empirical Models
3.2.1  Model 1 for the Effect of Ownership on Antibiotic 
Prescription
In the analysis of whether the type of health centre owner-
ship affected the frequency of antibiotic prescription, we 
included all prescriptions (antibiotic and non-antibiotic) and 
estimated the effect of ownership on the probability of a 
prescribed drug being an antibiotic. The dummy variable 
Antibiotic was defined to equal one when the drug belonged 
to the ‘J01—Antibacterial drugs’ group according to the 
ATC classification, with methenamine (J01XX05) excluded. 
Methenamine is not considered an antibiotic but is rather an 
antiseptic substance that has no influence on AR [25]. Based 
on workplace information, we created the dummy variable 
Private, which indicates whether the primary centre was pri-
vate or public. Health centres may significantly differ in the 
age and sex of patients, therefore we included in the analysis 
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the patient was a 
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women, as well as dummy variables for patients’ age groups. 
We grouped patients into nine age groups: 0–2, 3–6, 7–12, 
13–18, 19–25, 26–45, 46–65, 66–85 and ≥ 86 years of age. 
Controlling for the patient’s age is important because, for 
example, the prescription of non-antibiotic drugs to children 
is substantially lower than for adults.
We defined the variable Prescriptions_per_patient for each 
health centre each year as the total number of prescriptions 
divided by the number of registered patients. We used this 
variable to control for the fact that some health centres may 
systematically prescribe more drugs per patient (antibiotic and 
non-antibiotic), for example due to treating patients with more 
severe diseases. If private and county-employed physicians pre-
scribe the same number of antibiotics per patient, but private 
physicians prescribe fewer non-antibiotics, then the variable 
Prescriptions_per_patient prevents the estimate for Private from 
becoming positive just because a higher share of prescriptions 
written by private physicians are for antibiotics. We also con-
trolled for the municipality where the health centre was located 
(Muni_centre), municipality-specific linear trends (Muni_cen-
treTrend) and dummies for 59 of the 60 months studied (Year-
Month). The equation for model 1 is (Eq. 1):
3.2.2  Model 2 for Differences in the Prescription of Broad‑ 
and Narrow‑Spectrum Antibiotics
With the second model, we examined whether there was a 
systematic difference in the prescription of broad- versus 
narrow-spectrum antibiotics between private and public 
health centres. Broad is a dummy variable with a value of 1 
for the medications listed as broad-spectrum antibiotics in 
Table 1. Our selection of specific types of antibiotics was 





























experts at the Swedish Institute for Communicable Disease 
Control. Some antibiotic prescriptions (about 20%) from the 
original dataset belong to neither the narrow-spectrum nor 
broad-spectrum group (in the way we defined them).
We extracted all prescriptions for antibiotics that were 
classified as either broad- or narrow-spectrum antibiotics 
according to Table 1, which gave us 152,055 observations 
that we applied to the equation for model 2 (Eq. 2):
A maximum likelihood logit estimator was used to esti-
mate models 1 and 2. To examine the robustness of the 
results, several other estimations were performed. These are 
presented and discussed in the online Appendix.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in 
models 1 and 2. It shows that the proportion of prescriptions 
for antibiotics, in particular broad-spectrum antibiotics, is 
higher for physicians working at private health centres. The 
descriptive statistics also show that 63% of antibiotics were 
prescribed to women.
3.2.3  Models 3 and 4 for the Impacts of a New Private 
Health Centre
Models 3 and 4 were used to assess whether the number of 
antibiotic prescriptions per inhabitant and the proportion of 
broad-spectrum antibiotics prescribed were affected by the 
number of private health centres in the patient’s municipal-
ity of residence, N_Private. We consider this variable to be 
a proxy for the supply of private health centre services. As 
the variation in N_Private was limited to the opening of 
one new health centre, the estimates for this variable should 
be viewed as results from one case study. We lacked data 





























Table 1  Classification of broad- 
and narrow-spectrum antibiotics
The codes in square brackets are Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical classification codes assigned by the 
World Health Organization
Narrow-spectrum antibiotics Broad-spectrum antibiotics
PcV (phenoxymethylpenicillin) [J01CE02] Amoxicillin [J01CA04]
Nitrofurantoin [J01XE01] Amoxicillin and enzyme inhibitor [J01CR02]
Pivmecillinam [J01CA08] Doxycycline [J01AA02]
Trimethoprim [J01EA01] Cephalosporins [J01DB + J01DC + J01DD + J01DE]
Erythromycin [J01FA01]
Quinolones [J01MA02 + J01MA06]
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patients not living in Västerbotten, and therefore excluded 
these prescriptions when estimating models 3 and 4. The 
equation for model 3 is (Eq. 3).
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
number of prescribed antibiotics per resident in munici-
pality r in year–month y of age group a and sex s. Natural 
logarithms were used to allow N_Private to have the same 
percentage effect on the number of antibiotics prescribed in 
(3)



















demographic groups with few antibiotic prescriptions per 
capita as in demographic groups with many antibiotic pre-
scriptions per capita. For each municipality of residence and 
each year, we chose to have separate observations for each 
age group × sex combination to be able to control for dif-
ferences in demographic composition across municipalities 
and time. We also controlled for municipality of residence of 
the patient (Muni_patient) and municipality-specific linear 
trends to avoid the coefficient for N_Private to be affected 
by differences in health between residents of Umeå (where 
the new health centre was opened) and residents of other 
municipalities. Muni_patient was identical to Muni_cen-
tre for 95% of the prescriptions, but we chose the former 
because it is less risk that patients’ choices of place of resi-
dence are affected by preferences for antibiotics compared 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics for models 1 and 2
Percentages are reported for discrete variables, and means and standard deviations are reported for continuous variables. Descriptive statistics for 
the municipality-specific time trends and the 60-month dummies are available upon request.
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Sample Antibiotic Non-antibiotic Sample Broad-spectrum Narrow-spectrum
Private 16.17 16.68 16.14 16.90 18.14 16.30
Women 57.99 63.39 57.76 66.41 51.21 73.84
Prescriptions_per_patient 3.77 ± 1.00 3.70 ± 0.99 3.77 ± 1.00
Age group 0–2 0.66 3.52 0.53 3.96 2.97 4.45
Age group 3–6 0.69 4.35 0.53 4.80 2.95 5.70
Age group 7–12 0.73 3.67 0.60 3.83 2.18 4.64
Age group 13–18 1.12 5.41 0.94 4.61 3.37 5.22
Age group 19–25 2.66 8.60 2.40 7.93 6.57 8.59
Age group 26–45 11.51 18.37 11.22 17.88 17.74 17.95
Age group 46–65 30.39 22.71 30.72 22.47 27.97 19.78
Age group 66–85 42.72 26.79 43.40 27.78 29.92 26.72
Age group ≥ 86 9.53 6.58 9.65 6.74 6.33 6.93
Municipality of the health centre
Nordmaling 2.89 2.28 2.91 2.44 1.91 2.70
Bjurholm 1.08 0.91 1.09 0.89 0.90 0.89
Vindeln 2.49 2.33 2.49 2.36 2.40 2.34
Robertsfors 2.96 2.48 2.98 2.48 2.80 2.33
Norsjö 2.10 2.17 2.09 2.27 2.27 2.27
Malå 1.96 1.97 1.96 1.98 1.99 1.98
Storuman 3.29 3.19 3.30 3.11 3.19 3.08
Sorsele 1.49 1.83 1.47 1.87 2.21 1.70
Dorotea 1.55 1.28 1.56 1.21 1.30 1.16
Vännäs 3.03 2.75 3.04 2.69 2.32 2.87
Vilhelmina 3.62 3.89 3.61 3.77 4.53 3.40
Åsele 1.70 1.56 1.71 1.56 1.66 1.51
Umeå 40.10 41.35 40.05 41.52 41.50 41.53
Lycksele 5.98 5.97 5.98 6.05 6.12 6.02
Skellefteå 25.77 26.05 25.76 25.81 24.91 26.24
Observations 4,596,194 189,579 4,406,615 152,055 49,940 102,115
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with Muni_centre. Lastly, we included dummies for year × 
month combinations.
Model 4 included the same explanatory variables as those 
in model 3, but its dependent variable was  Share_broadryas. 
For each municipality of residence × year × age group × 
sex combination, this variable equals the number of pre-
scriptions of broad-spectrum antibiotics divided by the 
total number of prescriptions classified as either broad- or 
narrow-spectrum antibiotics. Models 3 and 4 were both 
estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). In model 3, 
the observations were weighted using yearly data for the 
number of inhabitants in each municipality × age group × 
sex combination, whereas the number of prescriptions clas-
sified as either broad- or narrow-spectrum antibiotics for 
each observation was used as weights in model 4. Table 3 
presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and 
some explanatory variables in models 3 and 4. The value for 
the weighted share of women in model 4 means that 66% of 
prescriptions classified as either broad- or narrow-spectrum 
antibiotics were for women.
4  Results
Table 4 presents the main results for the study. For model 
1, the odds of prescribing an antibiotic were 1.06 higher for 
private health centres than for public centres, holding all 
other factors constant. This result can be interpreted in abso-
lute terms using the fact that public physicians prescribed 
antibiotics in about 4.10% of cases, making the odds equal to 
0.0428. Then, for private health centres, the odds increased 
by 6% to 0.0454, which means that the probability that a 
prescription was for an antibiotic was approximately 4.34%. 
This is 0.24 percentage points higher than the probability for 
public health centres. In relative terms, 4.34 is 6% higher 
than 4.10, meaning that the probability that a prescription 
was for an antibiotic was 6% higher for private health centres 
than for public centres, holding all other factors constant. 
Because the proportion of antibiotic prescriptions was very 
low, this increase in relative risk was approximately equal 
to the odds ratio minus one.
We also found significant effects of demographic vari-
ables on the probability that a prescription was for an anti-
biotic. According to the point estimates from the logistic 
regression of model 1, this probability was higher for women 
than for men and decreased with age up to the 66–85 years 
age group. The estimate for Prescriptions_per_patient 
showed that the probability of a prescription being for an 
antibiotic was not significantly related to the average number 
of prescriptions per patient listed at the health centre.
The results for model 2 show that the odds of prescribing 
broad-spectrum antibiotics (versus narrow-spectrum anti-
biotics) were 1.14 higher for private health centres than for 
public centres. Public physicians prescribed broad-spectrum 
antibiotics in about 32.35% of the cases, making the odds 
approximately equal to 0.4782. Hence, the model predicted 
the odds for private health centres to be about 0.5451 if they 
had prescribed to patients with the same demographics as 
the patients of county-employed physicians. This means 
that the probability of a broad-spectrum antibiotic being 
prescribed was approximately 35.28%, which was 3 per-
centage points higher than the probability for public health 
centres. In relative terms, physicians in private centres were 
9% more likely to choose a broad-spectrum antibiotic when 
prescribing any antibiotic than county-employed physicians, 
holding all other factors constant. The results for model 2 
also showed that the probability of prescribing broad-spec-
trum antibiotics was lower for women and increased with 
age up to the 46–65 years age group.
In the online Appendix, we show that the results for mod-
els 1 and 2 are robust to using probit instead of logit estima-
tion, to controlling for age by using the continuous variables 
age and  age2 instead of indicators for age groups, and to 
excluding municipality-specific linear trends.
Because the dependent variable in model 3 was in natural 
logarithms and the model was estimated with OLS, the coef-
ficient estimates show the approximate1 percentage impact 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics for models 3 and 4
Percentages are reported for discrete variables, and means and stand-
ard deviations are reported for continuous variables. For model 3, the 
observations were weighted by the number of inhabitants, and for 
model 4, the weights were the number of prescriptions classified as 
either broad- or narrow-spectrum antibiotics. Descriptive statistics 
for age groups, municipality indicators, municipality-specific linear 
trends and the 60-month dummies are available upon request. For 
model 3, descriptive statistics are not reported for the weighted share 
of 2%  of the observations for which N_antibiotics = 0 because the 
dependent variable was not defined for these observations. The online 
Appendix shows that nearly identical results were obtained when the 
dependent variable was transformed so that all observations could be 
used in the estimation. For model 4, the number of observations is for 
observations with a strictly positive weight, that is, for which at least 
one antibiotic classified as either broad- or narrow-spectrum was pre-
scribed. There was no missing information for model 4
Variable Model 3 Model 4
N_antibiotics 0.012 ± 0.008
lnN_antibiotics − 4.595 ± 0.581
Share_broad 0.329 ± 0.198
N_Private 2.352 ± 1.937 2.080 ± 1.921
Women 49.927 66.480
Observations 13,352 12,606
1 The estimated percentage effect of a variable can be calculated 
using the formula 100 ∗ [eBi − 1] , where Bi is the coefficient estimate 
for the variable. For example, the estimated effect of a unit increase 
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of the explanatory variables on the number of antibiotic 
prescriptions per capita. Hence, the estimate for N_Private 
indicates that one additional private health centre increased 
the number of antibiotic prescriptions in the municipality 
by nearly 4%. It should however be noted that the effect of 
N_Private is estimated imprecisely because of the small vari-
ation in this variable and the estimate is only significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 10% significance level. The results for 
model 3 also show that women and the elderly received more 
antibiotic prescriptions than men and younger individuals.
The point estimate for N_Private for model 4 is consistent 
with the presence of a higher number of private health centres 
leading to a larger proportion of broad-spectrum antibiotic pre-
scriptions. However, the estimate is not statistically significant, 
which prevents us from concluding that this is indeed the case. 
In the online Appendix, we show that the estimate is significant 
at the 10% level if the natural logarithm of  Share_broadryas is 
used as the dependent variable instead of  Share_broadryas. The 
result for model 4 confirms the result for model 2 that women 
and children were less likely to be prescribed a broad-spectrum 
antibiotic than men and older age groups.
5  Discussion and Conclusions
Growing rates of AR, caused by increasing antibiotic use, 
pose a threat to current and future generations due to anti-
biotic drugs becoming less effective in treating infectious 
diseases. Therefore, it is crucial to discover the factors 
affecting antibiotic use. Our results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the incentives for private health centres to 
please patients may result in more prescription of antibiot-
ics, and, in particular, broad-spectrum antibiotics.
The results of our first model show that physicians 
working at private health centres were 6% more likely to 
prescribe antibiotics than non-antibiotic drugs compared 
with county-employed physicians working in non-profit 
health centres. This result alone does not prove that private 
physicians are more likely to prescribe antibiotics than 
county-employed physicians for similar patients because 
unobserved characteristics can differ systematically 
between patients seeking care at private health centres and 
those seeking care at public centres. For example, it cannot 
be ruled out that patients with infectious diseases are more 
likely, for some reason, to visit private health centres. 
Table 4  Results of estimation, odds ratios for models 1 and 2, and coefficient estimates for models 3 and 4
The dependent variables are as follows: model 1, an indicator for the prescribed drug being an antibiotic; model 2, an indicator for the prescribed 
antibiotic being broad-spectrum; model 3, the natural logarithm of the number of prescribed antibiotics per resident; model 4, the proportion of 
antibiotic prescriptions that are broad-spectrum. Standard errors derived from asymptotic theory under the assumption of independence between 
observations are shown in parentheses. Estimation results for year × month dummies, fixed effects and separate linear trends for the municipal-
ity where the health centre was located (Muni_centre), and fixed effects and the separate linear trend for the municipality of residence (Muni_
patient) are omitted to save space and are available upon request. FE fixed effects, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 1 2 3 4
Private 1.060*** (0.008) 1.140*** (0.019)
N_Private 0.037* (0.021) 0.013 (0.010)
Women 1.297*** (0.006) 0.337*** (0.004) 0.573*** (0.006) − 0.236*** (0.003)
Age group 3–6 1.232*** (0.023) 0.817*** (0.035) − 0.101*** (0.021) − 0.031*** (0.009)
Age group 7–12 0.917* (0.018) 0.762*** (0.035) − 0.603*** (0.020) − 0.040*** (0.009)
Age group 13–18 0.825*** (0.015) 1.193*** (0.051) − 0.283*** (0.020) 0.040*** (0.009)
Age group 19–25 0.516*** (0.008) 1.572*** (0.059) − 0.430*** (0.018) 0.091*** (0.008)
Age group 26–45 0.236*** (0.004) 1.913*** (0.065) − 0.425*** (0.017) 0.130*** (0.007)
Age group 46–65 0.108*** (0.002) 2.845*** (0.095) − 0.223*** (0.017) 0.216*** (0.007)
Age group 66–85 0.089*** (0.001) 2.260*** (0.074) 0.338*** (0.017) 0.161*** (0.007)
Age group ≥ 86 0.095*** (0.002) 1.955*** (0.075) 0.856*** (0.025) 0.131*** (0.008)
Prescriptions_per_patient 0.997 (0.004)
Year × Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni_centre FE Yes Yes
Muni_centre linear trends Yes Yes
Muni_patient FE Yes Yes
Muni_patient linear trends Yes Yes
Observations 4,596,194 152,055 13,352 12,606
Log likelihood − 790,026 − 89,700 − 3680 6550
R2 0.699 0.473
 D. Granlund, Y. V. Zykova 
However, the results of model 3 show that the number of 
prescriptions for antibiotics increased with the number of 
private health centres in the municipality. This indicates 
that the result for model 1 is not entirely caused by patients 
needing antibiotic prescriptions to a greater extent choos-
ing to visit private health centres. Instead, the results of 
models 1 and 3 are both consistent with physicians work-
ing at private health centres being more likely to prescribe 
antibiotics, all else being equal, so that an increase in the 
number of private health centres leads to more antibiotic 
prescriptions. However, other interpretations of the effects 
of a new private health centre are also possible. For exam-
ple, a new private health centre increases competition for 
patients, which can affect the prescription behaviour of 
both public and private health centres. It can also increase 
access to primary care and therefore reduce the possibility 
that some patients refrain from seeking care.
The results from the second model show that private phy-
sicians, in addition to being more likely to prescribe antibiot-
ics, were 9% more likely than county-employed physicians 
to choose broad-spectrum antibiotics. Even though a system-
atic variation in diagnoses between different health centres 
may also affect this result, we believe that the second model 
is much less vulnerable to these potential differences since 
it considers infectious diseases only. Thus, the result from 
the second model strengthens the support for our hypothesis 
that antibiotic prescription at private centres is affected by 
their stronger incentives to please patients.
The results also show significant difference in antibi-
otic prescriptions across demographic groups. Women are 
prescribed more antibiotics than men and this might be 
partly explained by women having a higher frequency of 
urinary tract infections, a common reason for antibiotic use 
[26]. In addition, according to model 3, elderly patients are 
prescribed more antibiotics but, according to model 1, the 
likelihood that a prescription is for an antibiotic is lower for 
elderly patients compared with younger patients. Together, 
these results suggest that elderly patients are prescribed 
more antibiotics per person, but are prescribed even more 
other drugs, making the proportion of antibiotic prescrip-
tions lower for the elderly than for younger individuals.
An important limitation of this study is the lack of diag-
nostic information. This prevents us from drawing conclu-
sions about the appropriateness of the antibiotic prescrip-
tions made by county and privately employed physicians. 
In addition, the results of model 3 and 4 do not allow us to 
exclude the possibility that at least part of the differences 
across physician groups observed in models 1 and 2 are 
caused by the selection of patients. For this reason, future 
research should preferably be based on individual-level data 
on visits that includes diagnostic information, and the diag-
noses should preferably be set by another physician than the 
prescribing physician to reduce the risk that the diagnoses 
set are adjusted to better motivate the prescriptions. Another 
limitation is that we do not have information about the pre-
scribers’ age, sex, or type of employment contract (e.g. per-
manent or temporary), therefore we cannot study if these 
factors dampen or increase the differences in prescription 
behaviour between private and public physicians.
The high use of antibiotics, especially broad-spectrum 
antibiotics, imposes a cost for society in terms of grow-
ing rates of AR. Privatisation can improve efficiency in 
healthcare provision. However, our results suggest that it 
may be especially important to monitor antibiotic prescrip-
tion at private health centres, and to give these centres 
economic incentives to adhere to guidelines for antibiotic 
prescription.
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